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Deduction of Traveling Expenses by the Two-

Worker Family-An Inquiry into the Role of
the Courts in Interpreting the Federal Tax Law
William D. Popkin*
ProfessorPopkin urges that courts interpretsection 162 of the
InternalRevenue Code, which permits a deduction for business
expenses, also topermit a two-worker family to deduct thatpartof
their transportation costs and living expenses attributable to a
second job. After tracing the currentstate of the law, he contends
that the implicit assumption of the Code-that marriedtaxpayers
live together and constitute a single consumption unit-should
allow deduction of some commuting costs and living expenses,
much as a single taxpayer is allowed a deductionfor transportation
to and living expenses at a secondary place of business. Last,
ProfessorPopkin argues that courts need not defer to the legislature before allowing the deduction.

As it has become more common for both spouses to work,I an ability to
deduct additional expenses that result from the decision of both husband and
wife to work has increased in importance. Attention first focused on the
deduction of child-care and household expenses incurred by the two-worker
family, 2 and Congress responded by permitting the deduction of these
expenses under standards that have been continually liberalized. 3 In addition
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law (Bloomington). A.B. 1958, LL.B
1961, Harvard.
1. In 1970 and 1973 the percentage of husband-and-wife families with both spouses workinj
exceeded the percentage with only a working husband. See BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T 0
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 364 (96th ed. 1975) (Table 564).
2. See, e.g., Feld, Deductibility of Expensesfor Child Care and HouseholdServices: Ne
Section 214, 27 TAx L. REv. 415 (1972); Hjorth, A Tax Subsidy for Child Care: Sec. 210 of t
Revenue Act of 1971, 50 TAxES 133 (1972); Klein, Tax DeductionsforFamilyCareExpenses, I
B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 917 (1973); Popkin, HouseholdServices and ChildCarein theIncon
Tax and Social Security Laws, 50 IND. L.J. 238 (1975); Schaffer & Berman, Two Cheersfort
Child Care Deduction, 28 TAX L. REV. 535 (1973).
3. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 501(a) (1) (Oct. 4, 1976) (codified
I.R.C. § 44 A); Revenue Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-490, § 2, 88 Stat. 1466; Revenue Act
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 210(a), 85 Stat. 518; Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-27
§ 212(a), 78 Stat. 49.
Although most taxpayers will benefit by the 1976 amendments, some taxpayers may be hv
The benefit arises principally because a tax credit replaces a deduction once unavailable
taxpayers who elected the standard deduction. The deduction might have been more valuabli
high-income taxpayers, however, than the new credit. A married taxpayer who earned $35,1
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to child-care and household expenses, however, the two-worker family may
confront additional expenses for transportation and living expenses over and
above the costs a one-worker family would incur. For example, two married
individuals might live together but work apart. The husband might work in a
Chicago suburb near the family's residence, but the wife might take a job that
requires her to commute to work in downtown Chicago. Or if a husband and
wife temporarily live and work apart while they search for suitable jobs in the
same location, they would incur the extra living expense of maintaining two
abodes. This duplication of expenditure might occur if a wife accepts a job as
a professor in one city, but her husband, although hoping to get a teaching job
in the same location, finds his best professional opportunity in another city.
The spouses might thus live separately for a short period of time while
searching for professionally satisfying work in the same city.
This article addresses whether the additional transportation and living
expenses that arise when both spouses work are deductible. The Government
argues that the determination whether expenses are deductible because they
exceed normal commuting and living expenses as a result of a work decision
or whether they are not deductible because the result of personal choice
should be made without consideration of an individual's marital status. 4 This
article argues the alternative view that marriage is relevant in making this
determination. Part I discusses the rules applicable to the deduction of
transportation and living expenses by a single taxpayer. Part II discusses the
arguments for and against treating married individuals differently from single
taxpayers and concludes that marriage should be relevant in determining
whether the two-worker family has deductible traveling expenses. Last, Part
III applies that conclusion to fact situations that typically present added
transportation and living expenses for a two-ivorker family.
I.

The Single Taxpayer's Deduction for Traveling Expenses

A.

TransportationExpenses
If an individual's residence and principal place of business are in
different locations, Commissioner v. Flowers5 presumed that the difference
arose because of a personal decision to live apart from the principal place of

and spent $4000 on child care provided in the home would have saved $840 in taxes. See I.R.C.
§ l(a); Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No- 94-12, § 206, 89 Stat. 32; Revenue Act of 1971,
Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 210(a), 85 Stat. 518. The credit, which is 20% of the expenditures, might
be $800 or less depending on the number of dependents in the household. I.R.C. § 44A(a).

4. See Chwalow v. Commissioner, 470 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1972); Hammond v. Commis-

sioner, 213 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1954); Robert A. Coerver, 36 T.C. 252 (1961), aff'dper curiam, 297
F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1962); C. Raymond Shafer, 20 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 977 (1961).
5. 326 U.S. 465 (1946).
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work. 6 The expenses of commuting to the principal place of business are
therefore not deductible. 7 Expenses of transportation from the principal place
of work to a secondary place of business are, however, deductible if the travel
is required by business need,8 because it is unreasonable to expect the
taxpayer to move his or her residence to the secondary business location.
In most cases, the distinction between a principal and secondary place of
business is clear, but some problems do occur.' When the time spent and
income received in connection with both places of work are substantial, there
may be no easy way to identify the principal place of work. Faced with this
uncertainty, the taxpayer should be allowed to deduct the expenses for travel
to the business farthest from the taxpayer's residence. When two businesses
rival each other for prominence, the taxpayer cannot reasonably be required to
choose which of the jobs is the principal one, and the taxpayer cannot be
expected to move closer to any job except the one closest to his or her
residence. The expenses of transportation to the business farthest from the
residence are therefore attributable to a business rather than a personal
decision. 10
Considerable controversy arises over the precise method for computing
additional transportation expense resulting from travel to the secondary place
6. "[The commuting costs] were incurred solely as the result of the taxpayer's desire to
maintain a home in Jackson while working in Mobile .
Id. at 473.
7. 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-2(e) (1976).
8. Rev. Rul. 453, 1976-47 I.R.B. 6, 7-8 (effective date changed to July 1, 1977, 1977-7 I.R.B.

31) (Examples 3, 7, 8, & 11). For a discussion of the correct computation of the deduction for
additional transportation expenses arising from a second place of business, see text accompanying notes 11-21 infra.
The rule disallowing the deduction of commuting expenses to the principal place of work
applies even if a taxpayer has no reasonable way to move closer to his or her work. See Sanders v.
Commissioner, 439 F.2d 296 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971); United States v.
Tauferner, 407 F.2d 243 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 824 (1969). This rule eliminates
litigation over whether a taxpayer possibly could move closer to the worksite and treats all
taxpayers alike for commuting expenses. Taxpayers who commute to a temporary job also may
not deduct their transportation costs because that would unfairly distinguish between two
taxpayers at the same job, only one of whom was on temporary duty. See Turner v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 27, 33 (1971) ("Commuting is commuting.
...); Rev. Rul. 453, 1976-47
I.R.B. 6.
9. Identifying the principal place of business permits the determination whether transporta-

tion expenses are personal expenses. The deduction for transportation expenses does not depend
on a taxpayer being away from "home" and, therefore, does not depend on whether the term
"home" in I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) means "principal place of business." See Turner v. Commissioner,
56 T.C. 27, 30-31 (1971).
10. See Joseph H. Sherman, Jr., 16 T.C. 332, 337 (1951) (taxpayer has "roots" at business
closer to residence). See also Abe Brenner, 26 Tax. Ct. Mem. Dec. 1210, 1214-15 (1967). The
Government may not agree with this approach because of its preoccupation with the taxpayer's
principal place of business. See Rosenspan v. United States, 438 F.2d 905,910-12 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971); Rev. Rul. 67, 1961-1 C.B. 25; Rev. Rul. 147, 1954-1 C.B. 51.
In the remainder of this article, references to a secondary place of business include the
business furthest from the taxpayer's residence when the identification of the principal and
secondary place of work is unclear.
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of business. There are two approaches to computing the amount of these
expenses. One approach, which the Government adopts, allows a deduction
for the expenses of going from the principal place of work (place 1) to the
secondary place of work (place 2) but for no other commuting expenses. 11 For
example, if a taxpayer goes from home to place 1, then to place 2, and finally
home again, he or she may deduct the cost of travel from place I to place 2,
but not the other transportation expenses between home and place 1 and
between place 2 and home. If a taxpayer goes home after working at place 1
and then commutes to place 2 and returns home, no deduction would be
allowed because all the trips were between the taxpayer's home and a place of
work and are therefore considered nondeductible commuting expenses. 12
The second and, in my. view, correct approach identifies deductible
transportation expenses by subtracting the cost of a round trip between home
and place 1 from the cost of going from home to place 1 to place 2 and home
again. The expense to go from home to place 1 and return is a personal
expense and should be subtracted from whatever total expense the taxpayer
incurred. This approach correctly identifies the additional expense required
by the second place of work by taking into account the actual location of place
2 in relation to both the taxpayer's home and place 1, but the Government's
approach focuses only on the travel between place 1 and place 2.
A few examples easily demonstrate that the Government's approach is
both over- and under-generous in certain situations. Generosity is most obvious when a taxpayer's second place of business is on the way back home
from the principal place of work. In the extreme case, place 2 lies on a direct
line between place 1 and home. 13 Assume that place 1 is eight miles from a
taxpayer's home and place 2 is three miles from place 1 on a direct line back
home. If the taxpayer stops at place 2 on the way home, the Government's
11. See Rev. Rul. 453, 1976-47 I.R.B. 6, 8 (Examples 7 & 8). In an earlier revenue ruling,
modified by the 1976 ruling, the Government conceded the possibility of deducting the cost of
going from place 2 to home if it exceeded the cost of going from place I to home. Rev. Rul. 109,
1955-1 C.B..261, 263. The case law supports the most recent Government position that the
taxpayer may deduct only the cost of going from place I to place 2. See Adelberg v. Commissioner, 30 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 68,70 (1971); Alvah I. Winslow, 23 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 1978, 1979
(1964); James A. Kistler, 40 T.C. 657, 663, 665 (1963); Clarence J. Sapp, 36 T.C. 852, 854-55
(1961).
12. Rev. Rul. 453, 1976-47 I.R.B. 6,8 (Example 10). Under Rev. Rul. 109, 1955-1 C.B. 261,
264, modified, Rev. Rul. 453, 1976-47 I.R.B. 6, the Government allowed a deduction for the cost
of going from home to place 2 and back home again to the extent that it did not exceed "the
transportation expenses [the taxpayer] would have incurred had he gone directly from one such
business location to'the other." James A. Kistler accords with the 1955 Ruling, but Marvin
Adelberg takes the approach in the 1976 Ruling. The Government allows a deduction for
transportation expenses from home to a secondary business destination, however, if the business
is in a city different from the principal place of work. Rev. Rul. 453,1976-47 I.R.B. 6,7 (Example

3).
13. This appears to be the situation in Alvah I. Winslow, 23 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 1978 (1964).
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approach would allow a deduction for the cost of the trip from place 1 to place
2. But not all expenses away from the principal place of business are business
expenses. Those expenses that would constitute nondeductible commuting
expenses, going from place 1 to home, are nondeductible personal expenses
regardless of whether the taxpayer stops at a second place of business.14
Under the preferable formula these normal commuting expenses are subtracted to determine deductible transportation expenses and, in the above
example, no deduction would result. 15
The approach suggested in this article is sometimes more generous than
the Government's approach; for example, if the trip from place 2 to home
exceeds the distance from place 1 to home. Assume that place 2 is ten miles
from home and place 1 is eight miles from home, and the distance between
place 1 and place 2 is three miles. In the preferable approach, the round trip
cost of the eight mile journey between home and place 1 would be subtracted
from the cost of making the circuit from home to place 1 to place 2 and home
again; the taxpayer thus should be able to deduct the cost of going from place
2 to home to the extent that it exceeds the cost of going home directly from
place 1 because the difference is an expense that arose from having a second
place of business. This approach results in a deduction for the cost of two
miles more than the Government would allow, since the Government would
limit the deduction to the cost of the three-mile trip between place 1 and
place 2.16
The two approaches also lead to different results when a taxpayer goes
home from place 1 before traveling to place 2. The Government disallows the
deduction of all resulting transportation expenses because the taxpayer never
17
travels away from a principal place of business, except to return home,
unless the second place of business is in a city other than the location of the
principal place of work. '8 The preferable approach attributes some portion of

14. For a discussion of a similar problem arising when a taxpayer's secondary place of
business and residence are the same, see text accompanying notes 32-33 infra.
15. The distance from home to place I (eight miles) to place 2 (three miles) to home (five
miles) totals sixteen miles. If the round trip commuting distance from home to place 1 and back
home again (sixteen miles) is subtracted from the sixteen miles traveled, no travel is attributable
to the second place of business. If the distance from place 2 to home were five-and-one-half
miles, a deduction would be allowed for the cost of traveling one-half mile because that
represents the actual travel distance required by the second business in excess of normal

commuting.
16. The deduction would be for a five-mile trip, which represents the three miles between
place I and place 2 and the extra two-mile distance to travel from place 2 to home rather than
from place I to home.
17. Rev. Rul. 453, 1976-47 I.R.B. 6, 8 (Example 10).
18. Id. (Example 3); see Rev. Rul. 497, 1954-2 C.B. 75, 82. The Government's position

allowing a deduction for transportation costs incurred to go out of town suffers from the same
confusion as its position allowing a deduction when the taxpayergoes fromplace I to place 2 and
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the expense of traveling to place 2 to business need because the taxpayer
cannot be expected to eliminate the gap between his residence and both places
of work, regardless of whether the two businesses are in the same city. The
amount attributable to business need should be the expense that would have
been deductible if the taxpayer had not indulged his personal preference for
going home first but had instead gone from place I to place 2 and then
19
home.
The error in the Government's approach to the taxpayer who returns
home from place 1 before going to place 2 becomes manifest in the example
of a taxpayer whose home and two businesses lie in a straight line. Assume
that place 1 is eight miles due east of the taxpayer's residence and place 2 is
ten miles due west of the residence. Under the Government's approach, a trip
from place 1 to place 2 results in a deduction of the cost of the eighteen-mile
trip if the taxpayer does not stop at home but no deduction results if the
taxpayer stops at home. 20 Such disparate consequences depending on whether
the taxpayer stops at his or her residence make no sense and are avoided by the
suggested alternate formula. That approach computes the mileage of traveling
from home to place 1 to place 2 and back home again (thirty-six miles),
subtracts the cost of commuting from home to place 1 and back home again
(sixteen miles), and allows a deduction for a twenty-mile trip-the extra
and above the cost of going
travel required by the existence of place 2, over
21
from home to place 1 and back home again.

then home. The theoretically correct deduction, the Government argues, is subject to a ceiling
amounting to the cost of a trip from place I to place 2 and back to place 1 again. But this ceiling
fails to take into account the possibility that place 2 is on the way back home and that the full cost
of going from place I to place 2 may not be attributable to business need. See text accompanying
notes 11-15 supra.The example in the 1976 ruling states that because the personal portion of the
transportation expenses of an out-of-town trip is de minimis, no need exists to determine the
theoretically proper way to compute the amount of deductible transportation expenses described
above. Rev. Rul. 453, 1976-47 I.R.B. 6, 7. The 1954 ruling makes no such assumption, however.
19. This approach is similar to that in the 1955 ruling, Rev. Rul. 109,1955-1 C.B. 261, since it
would allow a deduction when the taxpayer returns home before going to place 2 up to the amount
that would have been deductible if the taxpayer had gone from place I to place 2 to home. But this
approach differs in the computation of the deduction if the taxpayer had gone from place 1 to
place 2 and then home. See text accompanying notes 11-16 supra.
20. Rev. Rul. 453, 1976-47 I.R.B. 6, 8 (Examples 7 & 8).
21. The following example applies the reasoning in the text when the home, place 1, and
place 2 are not on a straight line. Suppose that the taxpayer lives eight miles from place 1, and ten
miles from place 2, and the distance between place 1 and place 2 is three miles. If the taxpayer
went home after working at place 1 and before going to place 2, the full cost of the 20-mile trip to
place 2 and home again should not be a deductible expense because it results from the personal
decision to go home first. The business portion of the trip to place 2 and back home again
represents the extra travel required by having a business at place 2, which is computed by
assuming that the taxpayer had gone to place 2 from place I instead of going home first. That
amount is the cost of a five-mile trip, which is the twenty-one-mile trip from home to place 1 to
place 2 and home again, less the sixteen-mile round trip from home to place 1 and home again.
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B.

Living Expenses

The deduction for living expenses depends on the same analysis as that
applied to transportation expenses-expenses are deductible when it is
unreasonable to require the taxpayer to move his residence to the business
destination to reduce expenses. 22 A deduction, therefore, usually is allowed
when the taxpayer works at a secondary or temporary place of business 23 or
when the principal place of business is not easily identifiable, and the
taxpayer works at the business farthest from his residence. 24 This rule is
qualified, however, by the requirement that business travel continue long
enough to require sleep or rest.25 This qualification prevents taxpayers who
are away on business for a short time from deducting expenses similar to the
26
nondeductible living expenses of the taxpayer who is not away on business.
The deduction for living expenses encounters a second difficulty in the
statutory requirement that a taxpayer not only have a business purpose but
also be "away from home." 2 7 For many years the Internal Revenue Service
interpreted "home" to mean "principal place of business" rather than
"residence," on the theory that this interpretation was necessary to ensure
that only business expenses would be deducted. 28 The Service never provided an adequate justification for this divergence from the plain meaning of
"home.''29 The requirement that the living expenses serve a business
purpose, combined with the Agency's flexibility in framing rules to implement that requirement, adequately protects the Government from the deduction of expenses with a personal purpose.3 0 More recently the Government

22. If, however, the taxpayer's stay at the new post of business is to be temporary...
it is not reasonable to expect him to move his residence; so if he incurs living expenses
at the temporary post, these are traveling expenses required by the trade or business
rather than by personal choice, and they are therefore deductible.
Ronald D. Kroll, 49 T.C. 557, 562-63 (1968).
23. See Rev. Rul. 189, 1960-1 C.B. 60. The deduction is only "usually" allowed because it
should not be allowed when the taxpayer's residence is located at the secondary place of
business. See note 32 infra & accompanying text.
24. See note 10 supra & accompanying text.
25. United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
26. Id. at 303-04.
27. I.R.C. §§ 62(2)(B), 162(a)(2).
28. Rosenspan v. United States, 438 F.2d 905, 910-12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864
(1971).
29. Cf. id. at 910 ("proper analysis of the problem has been beclouded").
30. "Home" need not mean "principal place of business" to prevent the deduction of
commuting expenses. See note 9 supra. In the case of living expenses, defining "home" as
"residence" may allow the taxpayer to arguethatthe maintenanceof two permanent residences,
one of which is at the principal place of business, is not the result of personal choice. The
argument might be plausible if the taxpayer works in a war zone, but the agency can formulate
rules to deny such deductions without distorting the meaning of the word "home." Cf.
Commissioner v. Stidger, 386 U.S. 287 (1967) (military taxpayer's permanent duty station is his
home for tax purposes).
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has agreed that "home" means "residence" when a taxpayer takes up
temporary work, 31 which suggests that the Government will no longer define
"home" as "principal place of business" when the result does not accord
with the underlying purpose of the statute.
In one situation, however, the taxpayer should not be entitled to deduct
living expenses at a secondary place of work. When the taxpayer's residence
is situated at the secondary business location, the additional living expenses
should be nondeductible personal expenses. Establishing a residence away
from the principal place of business causes extra living expenses, but these
expenses are the result of a personal decision to live away from the principal
place of work. The expenses at a taxpayer's residence are no less personal
expenses because the taxpayer takes a second job near his or her residence.
The Government does not agree with this conclusion. 3 2 Its generosity
towards the taxpayer arises, however, from a preoccupation with defining
"home" as the "principal place of business," which in this case results in
an allowance of a deduction for living expenses whenever the taxpayer
leaves the principal work location. As noted above, this definition of
"home" seems to be passing from the scene, and the Government therefore
that living expenses at the
seems likely to reverse its position and rule
33
secondary place of work are not deductible.
Last, deductible living expenses place a ceiling on the amount of deductible transportation expenses resulting from a secondary place of business if the taxpayer returns home before the business has been completed. In
the particular situation of a taxpayer who is away from his residence, but
returns for brief intermittent periods before completing the work at the
secondary place of business, the taxpayer is expected to minimize the cost of
having a second place of business. If the taxpayer returns home from a second
place of work while that business activity is still in progress, the deductible
transportation expenses for his visit home cannot exceed the living expenses
that would have been deductible if the taxpayer had stayed at the second place
34
of business instead of returning home.

31. Rev. Rul. 529, 1973-2 C.B. 37, 38.
32. Rev. Rul. 604, 1955-2 C.B. 49,50-51; Rev. Rul. 497, 1954-2 C.B. 75,80-81; Rev. Rul. 147,

1954-1 C.B. 51, 53.
33.

See note 31 supra. Those taxpayers who have substantial expenses at their residence

while conducting one of two businesses often may be those who have difficulty identifying the
principal and secondary places of business; the taxpayer can therefore deduct the living expenses

associated with the business farthest from the residence. See text accompanying notes 9-10,
24-25 supra.
34. Rev. Rul. 597, 1954-2 C.B. 75,82, reaches the same conclusion on living expenses. The
1954 ruling has been modified by the 1976 ruling for the temporary business traveler, but not for
the traveler with two places of work. Rev. Rul. 453, 1976-47 I.R.B. 6, 8 (Example 5).
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The Relevance of Marriage for Defining Deductible Traveling Expenses
The central concern of this article is whether a married individual should
be treated differently from a single individual in the determination of traveling
expenses attributable to a business purpose. The previous discussion of single
taxpayers demonstrated that expenses a taxpayer could reasonably be expected to avoid are attributed to personal purposes, and that expenses in
excess of that amount resulting from the decision to travel on business are
deductible traveling expenses. If marriage makes a difference in determining
whether a taxpayer has deductible traveling expenses, then the distinction
between nondeductible personal expenses and deductible traveling expenses
would depend on what could reasonably be expected of a married individual.
The crucial difference in reasonable expectations for single and married
individuals is that a single individual reasonably can be expected to live close
to his or her principal place of work, but a married individual cannot be
expected to move closer to his or her principal place of work if that would
mean being separated from a spouse. The normal life style of a married couple
is to live together at the same residence, and married individuals can only be
expected to move their residence close to the principal place of work for the
marital unit. If marriage makes a difference in defining deductible traveling
expenses, then the additional transportation and living costs resulting from
the marital unit's having a second place of work would be deductible, just as
the single individual can deduct expenses attributable to his or her second
place of work.
The argument for identifying deductible traveling expenses by reference
to the assumption that married individuals usually live together and cannot be
expected to live separately in order to live closer to their respective places of
work receives support from the rate structure in the Internal Revenue Code,
which already accepts this pattern of behavior as the norm for married
individuals. Two features of the tax law make this apparent. First, the Code
treats married individuals as a single consumption unit, taxed at the same rates
regardless of the contribution of each spouse to the total income of the marital
unit,3 5 unless evidence shows that the marriage has disintegrated. 36 Second,
the tax rate on married individuals who both contribute significantly to the
total income of the unit is higher than the tax rate applicable to two single
37
individuals earning incomes identical to each of the married individuals.
II.

35. See I.R.C. § l(a).
36. Sections 71 and 215 of the Internal Revenue Code split the marital unit's income in
accordance with the actual allocation of income between the spouses when the marital unit has

separated. A decree of separate maintenance or a written separation agreement must provide
proof of the separation. I.R.C. § 71(a) (1)-(2).

37. I.R.C. §§ l(a), (c); Bittker, FederalIncome Taxation and the Family, 27
1389, 1429-31 (1975).

STAN.

L. REV.
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Although this "tax on marriage" 38 inevitably results from the legislature's
decision to lower the tax on a single individual vis-h-vis the tax on a marital
unit with the same total income as the single individual and the legislature's
decision to tax all marital units alike, 39 the "tax on marriage" derives support
from the assumption that married individuals achieve economies of scale by
40
living together.
Arguably, however, the source of a married taxpayer's extra traveling
expense is the personal decision to marry; and expenses originating in
personal decisions are nondeductible personal expenses.4 1 Certainly, if the
taxpayers were not married, the expenses could not be attributed to a
secondary business activity of a marital unit; instead the expenses would be
related to the individual taxpayer's principal place of business and would not
be deductible. But to dismiss marriage as just another personal decision is
inconsistent with the treatment of marriage in the Code. The Code adopts a
separate rate structure that reduces the rates for marital units below those
applied to a single individual with the same total income as the marital unit. 42
The rationale for this rate reduction is that the cost of living for the two
spouses exceeds that of the single individual and that those costs should not be
included in the tax base. 4 3 The tax law treats the expenses incident to
marriage, like medical expenses, 44 as simply maintaining the taxpayer at a
baseline of utility, 45 rather than as expressing the particular tastes and
38. Cf. Bittker, supra note 37, at 1429 ("marriage penalty").
39. As long as married individuals were taxed as though they were two single individuals
each earning one-half of the marital unit's total income, marriage did not increase the tax on two
individuals who married. By lowering the tax on a single individual relative to a marital unit with
the same income as the single individual, however, the possibility arose that marriage would
increase taxes. For example, under the law prior to 1969, a marital unit with $20,000 of income
was taxed as though it had two $10,000 income earners. See Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-272, § 11 l(a), 78 Stat. 19. If two single individuals with $10,000 or with any combination adding
to $20,000 married, the tax could not increase. Under the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the tax on
single individuals was lowered so that the advantage for the marital unit would be reduced, but the
tax on marital units was not changed. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 803(a),
83 Stat. 678 (codified at I.R.C. § 1). As aresult, when two single individuals with $10,000incomes
marry, their total tax goes up. Only if one spouse has a small amount of income relative to the
marital unit's total income will the effect of the lower taxes on single individuals adopted in 1969
be offset by the fact that the rates on the total income of married individuals are lower than on a
single individual with the same total income. This problem could, of course, be avoided by taxing
married individuals as though they were unmarried, but then marital units with the same total
income would be treated differently. Fora more detailed explanation of this problem, see Bittker,
supra note 37, at 1429-31.
40. Bittker, supra note 37, at 1422-25. Professor Bittker questions assumptions about
economies of scale for high income taxpayers.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
42. I.R.C. §§ l(a), (c).
43. Bittker, supra note 37, at 1420-22.
44. I.R.C. § 213; see Andrews, PersonalDeductionsin an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARv. L.
REv.309, 331-43 (1972).
45. For a discussion of the concept of a baseline level of utility, see Note, FederalIncome
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preferences that make up the tax base. Allowing a business deduction for
those traveling expenses that result from a taxpayer's marriage is, therefore,
consistent with the statutory structure. Indeed, the Government sanctions
such an approach for the temporary business traveler. In deciding whether a
temporary business traveler has additional living expenses attributable to
business need at the business destination, the taxpayer's marriage is one
element in determining whether the taxpayer reasonably incurred such
46
expenses and, therefore, whether they are deductible business expenses.
The argument that a personal decision to marry originates the claim for
deducting traveling expenses and therefore taints all subsequent related
expenses as nondeductible personal expenses cannot be so easily dismissed,
however. Although the Code treats marriage as a personal decision that does
not give rise to taxable expenditures, the precise issue under consideration is
whether the additional traveling expenses incurred by the two-worker family
are deductible business expenses. Expenses that originate in a personal
decision may be deductible, but the legislature, not the courts, generally
makes that decision. Arguably, judges are unsuited to decide which personal
expenses reflect merely an effort to maintain a baseline standard of living 4 7and should therefore be deductible in determining the tax base-and which
personal expenses are taxable indulgences of personal tastes and preferences.
The history of the deduction of child-care expenses incurred to enable the
taxpayer to work can be cited in support of the proposition that the legislature
rather than the courts should decide when expenses originating in the personal
sphere of activity should be deductible. Although having children, like
marrying, possibly does not represent the type of personal decision that
should place all expenditures flowing from the initial decision to have
children in the taxable sphere of activity, courts rejected this view and held
that child-care expenses were not deductible business expenses, even if
incurred to enable the taxpayer to work. 4 8 Legislative action, 49 designed both
to implement tax equity and to deal with the social implications of denying the
50
deduction, was necessary to allow the deduction of child-care expenses.
The pivotal question then becomes whether the law governing deductible business expenses should be interpreted in the light of the statutory
structure that does not treat marriage as a taxable indulgence and treats living
Taxation of Employee FringeBenefits, 89 HAiv. L. REv. 1141, 1147 (1967). See also Andrews,
supra note 44, at 335-37.
46. See Rev. Rul. 529, 1973-2 C.B. 37, 38. The Service provides no concrete guidance on the
exact effect of marital status, however.

47. See note 45 supra.
48. Henry C. Smith, 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939), aff'd mere., 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940).
49. See note 3 supra.

50. See generally Klein, supra note 2.
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together as the normal condition for married individuals, or whether expenses
that originate in the decision to marry can only be deducted if the legislature
specifically provides for the deduction. In my view, the appropriate allocation
of authority between the courts and the legislature requires the courts to hold
marriage relevant in deciding whether the traveling expenses of the twoworker family are deductible. Three reasons support this conclusion.
First, the adoption by the legislature of a separate preferential rate
structure for married individuals-which recognizes that marriage is a
personal decision that does not give rise to taxable expenditures-obviates the
usual problem of requiring a court to identify a nontaxable sphere of activity.
The court need only make use of that legislative judgment about marriage in
interpreting section 16251 of the Code. The analogy to child-care expenses
can be distinguished because no separate rate structure for taxpayers with
children existed in 1939 when the Board of Tax Appeals settled the question
52
of deductibility against the taxpayer.
Second, although section 162 deals with business expenses, judicial
interpretation of that section may appropriately incorporate a legislative
judgment about personal expenses that lie outside the taxable sphere of
activity. Reductions in the tax base for personal expenses often serve the same
53
function as the deduction for business expenses in defining the fair tax base.
The Code sections that accomplish this function-for example, section 1(a),
which reduces the tax rates for marital units-stand in pari materia with the
business expense deduction; 54 therefore it is proper to use those provisions to
55
define deductible business expenses.

51. I.R.C. § 162 provides in pertinent part:
(a) In general.-There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business,
including(2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals and lodging other
than amounts which are lavish or extravagant under the circumstances) while
away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business....

52. See Henry C. Smith, 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939), aff'd mem., 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940). The
1954 Code provided a separate preferential rate structure for unmarried heads of households with
resident children. I.R.C. §§ l(b), 2(b). By 1954, however, legislative action on child-care
deductions preempted the field, and there was no room for judicial interpretation of §162 to
include child-care expenses beyond the explicit provisions of the statute. See note 57 infra &

accompanying text.
53. See Andrews, supra note 44, at 330-31.
54. Section 213, which allows a deduction for medical expenses, is another example of a
reduction in the tax base that serves the same function as the business expense deduction.

Reading sections such as § 213 in pari materia with § 162 would allowa business deduction forthe
expenses of commuting to work by a taxpayer who was required to take a taxicab for medical
reasons. Contra, John C. Bruton, 9 T.C. 882 (1947).
55. This approach to interpreting the Code calls for an aggressive judicial role that will not be
accepted by courts reluctant to impose their own view of the tax law because they fear they do not
understand it. Learned Hand's comments about the tax law epitomize this fear, Hand, Thomas
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Last, the existing legislation dealing with married taxpayers provides no
justification for the court to defer to the legislature in deciding whether the
traveling expenses of the two-worker family should be deducted. Existing
legislation should occasion judicial reticence only if some reason exists to
believe that existing legislation preempts the field. But the rate structure for
marital units does not deal with the special problems of the two-worker
family. It provides lower rates for marital units regardless of the work status
of the spouses and leaves unresolved the problem of the added expenses of the
two-worker family. Thus, traveling expenses differ from child-care expenses
after the adoption of a child-care deduction in 1954.56 The 1954 Code
contained a legislative judgment that only couples with income below a
certain amount could deduct child-care expenses, 57 which strongly suggested
that any judicial discretion to expand the right to the deduction to other
couples would violate the legislative intent.
I.

Identifying the Deductible Traveling Expenses of the Two-Worker

Family
This section provides examples of the deductions that would be allowed
if the assumption that married individuals normally live together were to
determine the deductibility of traveling expenses. In addition, the section
considers the argument that the administrative burden imposed by claims for
these deductions would be so great that the courts should avoid an interpretation of the tax law imposing those burdens on the Service.
A.

Examples of Deductible TravelingExpenses

1. Living Expenses.-If a husband and wife live together and one
spouse commutes daily to another location and returns home at night while the
other spouse works near the marital residence, none of the family's living
expenses would be deductible because all living expenses are incurred at the
spouse's residence. 58 This puts to rest the court's concern in Hammond v.
Commissioner,59 which concerned a husband who worked at the marital
Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1957), although he certainly never shied away from

interpreting the tax law creatively. See Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399,410 (2d Cir. 1957)
(dissenting opinion); Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 454

(1935). Judicial reticence is apparent in Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965), in which
thes Court adopted a dictionary definition of the term "sale" in preference to a more purposeful

interpretation. See also Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966).
56. See note 3 supra.
57. The mechanism effecting this policy was a provision that the deduction would gradually
disappear as income rose over $4500. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 591, ch. 736, 68A

Stat. 3, 70-71. The income levels were raised substantially in 1964, 1971, and 1975. See note 3
supra.
58. See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
59. 213 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1954).
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unit's principal place of business in Baton Rouge, but lived at the marital
unit's residence in New Orleans, where the wife also worked. The court
refused to consider marriage relevant in determining the deductible traveling
expenses of the two-worker family because of its concern that the wife's
living expenses at the unit's secondary place of business would be deductible. 60 Because the wife incurred her living expenses at the marital unit's
residence, however, the expenses would not be deductible even under the
proposed approach.
If the husband and wife do not live together at the marital residence, but
are only temporarily living apart, living expenses would be deductible if
incurred either at the business destination that is the marital unit's secondary
place of business or, if neither business seems clearly primary, at the business
destination farthest from the marital unit's residence. 61 This might occur, for
example, during a period when both spouses are working in different cities
while looking for work in the same city. Such a rule may result in a large
deduction, but the Code permits the deduction of all living expenses and the
size of the deduction causes problems in the context of single taxpayers as
well. 62 The solution lies in a legislative ceiling on the amount of the
deduction, as in the case of Congressmen, 63 not a disallowance of the
deduction altogether.
The proposed deduction for living expenses of one spouse who lives at a
business destination affects only those couples who undertake a temporary
business-related separation, because the argument for deducting additional
living expenses caused by professional exigencies derives its strength from
the assumption that married couples normally live together. If the couple
resolves to separate on a more permanent basis, their life style has departed
from the assumption embodied in the rate structure that they will live
together; their tax base thus should be determined on the same basis as a single
taxpayer. The Government took this approach in Six v. United States.64 Six
concerned a marital unit in which one spouse had set out on a business trip, but
a more permanent split between the husband and wife later developed. 65 The
court remanded the case to the trial court for a determination whether the
taxpayer was still temporarily absent from her home where her husband
66
worked or whether her home had moved.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 44.
See text accompanying notes 9-10, 24-25 supra.
See, e.g., Dowd v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 399 (1961).
I.R.C. § 162(a) (last sentence).
450 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1971).

65. Id. at 68.
66. Id. at 69-70. The court considered the effect of the taxpayer's marriage on the location of

the taxpayer's home, but did not adopt or reject the view in this article that the marital unit
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The example of spouses who temporarily work in different cities while
looking for work together does not differ in theory from the more typical
business trip. The only complication in the case of two spouses who
consciously decide to live apart temporarily, as opposed to the case of one
spouse who sets out on a business trip, is that identification of the marital
residence may be more difficult in the former situation. Because living
expenses are deductible only if incurred away from the marital residence,
ascertaining which spouse's expenses are deductible may pose the same
complexity as determining which living expenses are deductible for a single
taxpayer who has two businesses of more or less equal scope. 67 If one abode
is much smaller than the other and the spouse living at the smaller establishment visits the other spouse regularly, then the larger, more stable residence
emerges as the marital unit's residence. If the facts do not clearly identify
the marital residence, the more expensive establishment should be treated as
the marital residence; this choice minimizes the possibility that taxpayers
would abuse the right to deduct living expenses, although the requirement
that the separation be temporary already reduces the risk of abuse.
To summarize, the spouse who temporarily lives away from the marital
residence can deduct living expenses if that place of work is either the marital
unit's secondary place of business, or when neither business clearly emerges
as principal or secondary, if that place of work is the business farthest from the
marital residence.
2. TransportationExpenses.-The greatest impact on tax administration of the approach advocated in this article would be the allowance of a
deduction for some portion of the commuting expenses of the two-worker
family. Assume that a husband works two miles from the family's home in a
Chicago suburb, that the wife commutes ten miles to Chicago, and that the
distance between the two places of work is nine miles. If the wife's job is the
marital unit's secondary place of work, the couple could deduct the extra
traveling expense caused by the wife's daily trips to the unit's secondary work
site. The deduction of the wife's commuting expense results from the formula
advocated in Part I for computing a single taxpayer's deduction for trips to the
secondary place of business: the cost of traveling from the home to the

generally should be the reference point for determining deductible traveling expenses. Id.
Possibly the fact of marriage might be relevant for determining the location of a spouse's
"home," thus resulting in a deduction of living expenses, but irrelevant for determining whether
the spouse's business is a secondary place of work so that transportation expense would be
deductible. In my view, however, no basis exists for accepting the relevance of marriage for
defining "home" without also admitting the relevance of marriage for determining the deductibility of transportation expenses attributable to a secondary place of work.

67. See text accompanying notes 9-10 supra.
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husband's place of work to the wife's place of work and back home again
(twenty-one miles) less the round trip distance between home and the
husband's place of work (four miles).68 If the location of the wife's job were
the marital unit's principal place of work, a deduction would be allowed for
the cost of traveling attributable to the husband's job, which is the cost of
traveling twenty-one miles minus the twenty-mile round trip to the wife's job
and back home again. If neither job seemed clearly primary, the taxpayers
could deduct the cost attributable to traveling to the Chicago job because that
job is farthest from the residence.
The Government might argue against this result by asserting that
"commuting is commuting" 69 and that commuting expenses are never
deductible. 70 The Government might rationalize such a rule on the ground that
taxpayers should not receive disparate treatment of their commuting expenses
because of inconsequential differences in their circumstances. 7 1 But that
argument cannot be applied to the married couple without reopening the entire
issue whether marriage should make a difference in defining deductible
traveling expenses. The difference between the single commuter and the
married commuter is the fact of marriage, which results in the business
activities of the spouses being viewed as two businesses conducted by the
marital unit rather than single businesses separately carried on by each
spouse. From the perspective of a married unit, the commuting expenses
attributable to the unit's secondary business activity are no different from the
deductible commuting expenses attributable to a single individual's second
place of work.
A final problem concerns the spouse who is away from the marital unit's
residence, but returns home periodically to visit the other spouse. The
deduction of transportation expenses to make periodic visits home is subject
to the same ceiling that applies to the single individual who returns home from
a secondary place of work. No more than the living expenses that would have
been incurred at the second place of business should be deductible because the
taxpayer cannot deduct any greater amount than actually necessary to
72
complete work at the business destination.
B. Effect of AdministrativeProblems on the Interpretationof the Tax Law
The examples of traveling expenses deductible if marriage is relevant in
determining the deductions of the two-worker family indicate the numerous
68. See text accompanying notes 11-21 supra.
69. Commissioner v. Turner, 56 T.C. 27, 33 (1971).
70. See note 8 supra.

71. This reasoning leads to disallowance of a deduction for the cost of transportation to a
temporary job, presumably on the ground that the commuting expenses of workers with
temporary and permanent jobs were too similar. See Rev. Rul. 453, 1976-47 I.R.B. 6.
72. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
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factual issues that might arise, including: (1) the location of the principal
place of business of the marital unit; (2) the identification of deductible
traveling expenses if no one business is obviously the marital unit's principal
place of business; (3) the distances between home and the various places of
work; (4) the location of the marital residence; and (5) whether the spouses
live apart "temporarily." These disputes will undoubtedly burden the Service, especially since these expenses would be deductible whether or not the
73
standard deduction is elected.
Arguably, administrative problems of the Service are no concern of the
courts, and incorporation of these concerns into the tax law should occur by
Treasury regulations or agency ruling. 74 But that argument makes unrealistic demands on the administering agency. The regulations process is already
overburdened, 75 and although the process for adopting revenue rulings may
be modified to approximate the process for adopting regulations,76 the
Internal Revenue Service cannot be relied on as the only institution to be
concerned with administrative problems. Nonetheless, the circumstances in
which courts should consider administrative problems must be carefully
circumscribed. A prudential concern with administration must be weighed
against an individual's claim that a statute creates rights for the individual.
7
That weighing process should be left to institutions other than the courts,7
unless very few claims are likely to be justified or two interpretations of the
statute seem equally plausible. Claims by two-worker families to deduct
traveling expenses satisfy neither of these conditions.
First, as pointed out earlier, 78 the refusal to consider marriage relevant to
defining deductible traveling expenses is not as plausible as taking into
account that married couples usually live together. Second, many claims by
taxpayers concerning the factual issues set out above are likely to be justified.
These issues raise close questions of fact that can be decided in various
ways-as illustrated by litigated court cases and revenue rulings indicating
how to resolve the difficult factual disputes that might arise if marriage were
relevant.7 9 The proper role for the courts, therefore, is to allow the deduc73. I.R.C. §§ 62(2)(B), (C).
74. See 26 C.F.R. § 601.601 (1976) (description of regulations and rulings).
75. See Field, TheRegulationsBacklog:A Difficult ProblemRemains Unsolved,TAX NoTEs,
Nov. 22, 1976, at 3.
76. See 26 C.F.R. § 601.601(f) (1976).

77. Cf. Note, Specifying the ProceduresRequired by DueProcess:Toward Limitson the Use
of InterestBalancing,88 HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1975) (criticizes tendency of courts to defer in due
process cases).
78. See text accompanying notes 51-57 supra.
79. The factual issues that can arise if marriage is relevant for defining deductible traveling
expenses have occurred in the following contexts: (1) standards for locating the principal place of
business, see Rev. Rul. 67, 1961-1 C.B. 25; Rev. Rul. 147, 1954-1 C.B. 51; (2) identification of
deductible traveling expenses if no single business is obviously the principal place of business,
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tion for the additional traveling expenses of the two-worker marital unit
based on the assumption that married individuals normally live together and
let the agency or the legislature respond, if they consider it appropriate, by
adopting rules that deny the deductions.
see Abe Brenner, 26 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 1210(1967); Joseph H. Sherman, Jr., 16T.C. 332(1951);
(3) distance between home and various business locations, Rev. Rul. 453, 1976-47 I.R.B. 6; (4)
whether separation of spouses is temporary, see Six v. United States, 450 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1971).
The only factual issue that arises if marriage is relevant and that presently finds no direct parallel
in the litigation and revenue rulings dealing with deductible traveling expenses is the identification of the marital residence to determine which spouse can deduct living expenses when the
spouses are temporarily separated. See text accompanying note 67 supra. Other situations,
however, also require identification of a taxpayer's principal residence. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1034
(nonrecognition of gain when principal residence sold if another principal residence purchased
within a certain period of time).
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